Saturday, January 19, 2008

EDSA Dos: The Conspiracy According to Mike Arroyo

I've written about EDSA Dos from the point of view of someone who went out to the streets (here and here). It goes without saying that this is not the only perspective. In keeping with fellow blogger Anna's call for remembrance, i am reposting Mike Arroyo's personal account of the backroom conspiracy that took place* (in an interview published in the March 5, 2001 issue of The Philippine Graphic).

"She [Gloria Arroyo] had really left the Cabinet at the right moment: the timing was perfect. If she had tarried a moment longer, she would have been too late for EDSA: she would have made it there as an opportunist. And as for the ill-feeling in Metro Manila, we tackled that by going back to the door-to-door campaign: she went from barangay to barangay explaining her motives, outlining her program. And it worked. Then came the impeachment trial, and from there, tuloy-tuloy na."

"There was a time honestly, when I felt I erred in advising her to resign from the Cabinet. The masa in Manila apparently wanted her to stick it out with Erap. And when she started attacking him, everything fell on us - grabe!- everything! But I told myself: it's now or never; if we lose here we're totally destroyed and it's goodbye to her political career - but if we win here, she becomes President! So we really fought."

"We got all those Erap tapes from Ramon Jacinto and distributed them all over. We bought one million and a half million copies of Pinoy Times to give away so the public could read about the Erap mansions and bank accounts. "

"And when EDSA happened, we texted everybody to go running there. EDSA, EDSA: everybody converge on EDSA! Panalo kung panalo. Patay kung patay! Jinggoy had already announced what they would do to us if they won."

"Chavit Singson had Plan B involving elements of the military to strike the first blow. They would kindle the spark by withdrawing from the government, and one by one others would follow: Class '71 would also withdraw, then Class '72, and so forth. But General de Villa warned that the timing had to be precise because one untimely move against the government and the military would automatically defend it. The move must be made at what De Villa called a 'defining moment."

"You see, General De Villa had his Plan A, which was better than ours, because his was focused on the Chief of Staff and the Service Commanders. At past one o'clock p.m. January 20, Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes defected but we knew that already the night before, when negotiations had lasted until the small hours. By past 2 a.m. we knew Reyes had been convinced to join. His only condition was: 'Show us a million people on EDSA so it will be easier to bring in the service commanders.'"

"And they asked when the crowd was thickest; we told them: from three to five in the afternoon. So they agreed to come to EDSA at around that time. But while hiding in their safehouse, they got reports that General Calimlim could not be located and their first thought was: "He's out looking for us!" So they decided to rush to EDSA right away. When they got there, why there too at the Shrine was Calimlim! He had been looking for them all right, but join to join them, not to arrest them!"

"Our group there was a back-up strike force. In fact, it was our group that won over to our side the PNP first. If Panfilo Lacson had resisted, he and his men would have been repelled: there would have been bloodshed, but not on EDSA. In every place where Erap loyalists had a force, we had a counter-force to face it, with orders to shoot. And not only in Metro Manila. Carillo had already been sent to the provinces; and in Nueva Ecija, for instance, we had Rabosa. This was a fight to the finish. That's why those five days that Erap was demanding were so important. He was counting on counter-coups and baliktaran."

"I was negotiating with Pardo up to three o'clock in the morning: niloloko lang pala kami. But I told him point-blank: "If by six o'clock this morning you haven't given us the resignation letter, we will storm the gates of Malacañang!' But they insisted on more talk: with De Villa up front, and my back channel debate with Pardo, which even became a three-way contest, with Buboy Virata pitching in."

"But the threat to march to Malacañang was for real. And so was the danger of bloodshed. I wasn't telling Gloria everything: I didn't want her alarmed. So she didn't know about the orders to shoot."
Update Jan-20-2008: Remembering the above becomes especially relevant in light of Malacanang's call to "Forget EDSA II".

*Also posted in the blogs of Manilabaywatch, Schumey, Manuel Buencamino, John Marzan and in the column of Ellen Tordesillas.


eagle wild said...

This could very be described also as :The anatomy of power grab. One thing that stands out on this narrative is the meticulous planning involved by different persons, which has the effect of a well orchestrated endeavor.
Lesson learned - whether you go on vacation or undertake a revolution, three things must be considered - planning, planning planning. Going to church and praying for gloria to step down is anything else but planning.

cvj said...

Hi Eagle Wild, i agree.

AdB said...

"Its easy to say so many things, but can we put our money where our mouth is?"


eagle wild said...

oYes indeed. Words are cheap, not so with money. I have to reckon the expenses of long term planning at SFO airport parking when I had to be away four days out of the country, south of the border.