Anonymity, Pseudo-Anonymity and Privacy

The Guardian Unlimited article, which i linked to in my previous blog entry, presents the Electronic Frontier Foundation's defense of anonymous speech:

Kurt Opsahl, a senior staff lawyer with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an advocacy group that defends online free speech, privacy and intellectual property rights, said Kerr's argument ignores both privacy laws and American history.

"Anonymity has been important since the Federalist Papers were written under pseudonyms," Opsahl said. "The government has tremendous power: the police power, the ability to arrest, to detain, to take away rights. Tying together that someone has spoken out on an issue with their identity is a far more dangerous thing if it is the government that is trying to tie it together."

In other words, anonymity is necessary since government is not always benevolent, and free speech by the individual is valued by society.

On the other hand, blogger Bee contends that...

"an overdose of anonymity is fatal to every kind of constructive communication"

In her blog entry, she links to Kevin Kelly's contribution to the book What Is Your Dangerous Idea?, i.e. "More anonymity is good"
which highlights the dangers of too much anonymity:

"...in every system that I have seen where anonymity becomes common, the system fails...Communities infected with anonymity will either collapse, or shift the anonymous to pseudo-anonymous, as in eBay, where you have a traceable identity behind an invented nickname. Or voting, where you can authenticate an identity without tagging it to a vote...

Anonymity is like a rare earth metal. These elements are a necessary ingredient in keeping a cell alive, but the amount needed is a mere hard-to-measure trace. In larger does these heavy metals are some of the most toxic substances known to a life. They kill. Anonymity is the same. As a trace element in vanishingly small doses, it's good for the system by enabling the occasional whistleblower, or persecuted fringe. But if anonymity is present in any significant quantity, it will poison the system."

Kelly concludes that...

"Privacy can only be won by trust, and trust requires persistent identity, if only pseudo-anonymously. In the end, the more trust, the better."

The above discussion clarifies for me the value of anonymity, its relation to privacy, and its limits. More importantly, it introduces the concept of pseudo-anonymity, i.e. anonymity that is traceable to a particular identity.

Pseudo-anonymity can be a means to bridge the requirements of national security without sacrificing privacy. In practical terms:

1. The Telecommunication Companies and Financial Institutions need to implement technologies that will mask the identity of its users. These masking technologies will prevent the identity of the persons from being known (even by the Government) without the application of the corresponding unmasking technology.
2. The Government Intelligence Agencies can then continue to monitor the masked communications and/or transactions without any court order.
3. Once anything suspicious comes up, the Government Intelligence Agency can then apply for a court order requesting the unmasking of the relevant communications or transactions, i.e. linking these communications or transactions with a particular individual.

The above scheme balances the needs of privacy and national security.

Privacy Without Anonymity in the USA

A few months back, i wrote a blog entry on Privacy Without Anonymity. Over the weekend, Donald Kerr, principal deputy director of national intelligence in the United States, declared:

"Privacy no longer can mean anonymity...Instead, it should mean that government and businesses properly safeguard people's private communications and financial information."

Over at Boing Boing, where i stumbled upon this news, there is a lot of resistance to what it calls an Orwellian redefinition. I would tend to be more sympathetic since the tradeoff between privacy and transparency is not cut and dried and is something that merits thorough deliberation. As Kerr added:

"Our job now is to engage in a productive debate, which focuses on privacy as a component of appropriate levels of security and public safety...I think all of us have to really take stock of what we already are willing to give up, in terms of anonymity, but [also) what safeguards we want in place to be sure that giving that doesn't empty our bank account or do something equally bad elsewhere."

In principle, i agree with his statement although not necessarily with the policy of eavesdropping without a court order.

Privacy without Anonymity*

Yesterday, Manolo remarked that the two Senate bills to require registration of SIM cards might "irk the public". It probably will, but such a step is necessary in these times. Registration of SIM cards is essential for law enforcement especially now that cell phones are used as triggering devices for car bombs.

Maybe the public will be less irked if they are assured that sacrificing anonymity does not necessarily mean giving up privacy. The lawmakers who would take away the phone user’s anonymity are also responsible for putting more safeguards to that same phone user’s privacy.

In addition to requiring SIM card registration, the Telco's (e.g. Globe, SMART and Sun) should also be required to log the coordinates of every called number (gps coordinates if possible) as part of the call data record as an aid to subsequent investigation(s). However, such records should be kept confidential under normal circumstances.

As i told fellow commenter Baycas last year, society has to find a way to accept the loss of anonymity while strengthening safeguards to privacy.

One example of eliminating anonymity is the requirement to clearly identify a person as well as centralize personal information for easy access (via Identity Cards and a corresponding online database) which is in itself is a very useful for security and administrative purposes. However, this will only be acceptable if such information is treated with the same level of sanctity as a Swiss Bank Account accessible only by the person himself or through a valid court order. Making a person carry around his/her Identity Card and demanding it to be shown at will, opens the system to abuse resulting in further discontent and/or loss of freedom.

While we're on the subject, over at Crookedtimber, there is an informative entry on a form of information theft called phishing. It narrates specific cases of possible phishing incidents in the photo sharing website flickr.

Update (July 11, 2007 12:16pm): In the comments section, blogger Manila Baywatch gives a detailed explanation of how such a system of privacy without anonymity works in France through the various stages of a French citizen's existence.

*First three paragraphs was also submitted as a comment in mlq3's blog.